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Abstract
The sheer growth of electricity demand and the rising number of electricity-hungry
devices have highlighted and elevated the need of addressing the demand response
management problem in residential smart grid systems. In this thesis, a novel
contract-theoretic demand response management (DRM) framework in residential
smart grid systems is introduced based on the principles of labor economics. The
residential households produce and consume electricity, acting as dynamic prosumers.
Initially, the prosumers’ personal electricity generation and consumption characteristics are captured by introducing the concept of prosumers’ types. Then, the prosumers’ and the electricity market’s proﬁt is depicted in representative utility functions. Based on the labor economics principles, Contract Theory is adopted to design
the interactions among the electricity market, which oﬀers personalized rewards to
the prosumers in order to buy electricity at an announced price, and the prosumers,
who oﬀer their "eﬀort" by paying for the purchased electricity. The contract-theoretic
DRM problem is formulated as a maximization problem of the electricity market’s

iv

utility, while jointly guaranteeing the optimal satisfaction of the prosumers, under
the scenarios of complete and incomplete information from the electricity market’s
perspective regarding knowing or not the prosumers’ types, respectively. The corresponding optimization problems are solved following a convex optimization approach
and the optimal contracts, i.e., rewards and eﬀorts, are determined. Detailed numerical results obtained via modeling and simulation, highlight the key operation
features and superiority of the proposed framework.
This work has been published in:
N. Irtija, F. Sangoleye and E. E. Tsiropoulou, "Contract-Theoretic Demand Response Management in Smart Grid Systems," in IEEE Access,
vol. 8, pp. 184976-184987, 2020, doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3030195.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Smart grid systems have been introduced as an eﬃcient solution to the global energy
crisis given their inherent characteristics of communication, control, and optimization
that can conclude to the real-time balance among the power supply and demand [1].
The Demand Response (DR) has become a vital and critical component of the smart
grid systems, enabling the consumers to directly interact with the electricity market
by dynamically adapting their electricity consumption based on the announced price
and the supply availability [2]. Two main types of demand response have been
proposed in the literature; (a) direct or price-based DR, where the consumers directly
adapt their electricity consumption to the announced price and the utility company
has direct control on their consumption [3], and (b) indirect or incentive-based DR,
where a dynamic pricing is oﬀered to the consumers as an incentive to voluntarily
adapt their electricity consumption [4].
With the evolution of the smart grid systems and towards meeting the electricity
demands, the utility companies exploit the renewable energy resources as an alternative solution, due to the lack of availability of fossil fuels [5]. Also, the consumers
are encouraged to install small wind turbine power generation systems or rooftop
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solar photovoltaics to cover partially or completely their electricity needs. Furthermore, the electricity generation surplus from the residential power generation systems
is stored in rechargeable batteries (e.g., lithium-ion batteries and liquid electrolyte
“ﬂow batteries”) or in the electric vehicles (EVs). Both electricity storage alternatives can charge at night when the price is low and the supply is high, while sell back
to the smart grid when the electricity demand is high [6]. Thus, the traditional consumers are transformed to prosumers, becoming a critical component in the smart
grid systems’ smooth operation.

1.1

Related Work & Motivation

The problem of Demand Response Management (DRM) has been thoroughly studied
in the literature by introducing distributed or centralized solutions and accounting or
not for the prosumers’ behavioral characteristics and patterns of electricity consumption. In [7], a distributed Stackelberg game-theoretic approach is introduced among
one utility company and multiple consumers, where the ﬁrst one announces the electricity price and the latter ones adjust their electricity consumption. This problem
is extended in [8], where a multiple utility companies and multiple consumers smart
grid system is considered. The consumers select the utility company wherefrom they
will purchase the electricity by following a reinforcement learning approach and,
then, a two-stage game-theoretic framework is proposed to determine the optimal
electricity price and consumption. In [9, 10], the authors analyze the impact of the
communication unreliability among the electricity market (i.e., utility companies)
and the prosumers on the DRM performance and the electricity price. Speciﬁcally,
the authors formulate a joint maximization problem of the DRM performance with
respect to the electricity consumption and price, and solve it by leveraging the dual
decomposition method.
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The proﬁt maximization problem of the utility companies is studied in [11] by
formulating it as a ﬁnite-horizon continuous-state Markov Decision Process (MDR)
problem. The provided solution is also shown that it alleviates the supply-demand
imbalance in the smart grid and decreases the prosumers’ electricity bills. Towards
tackling the high computational complexity of the aforementioned problem, the authors have extended the previous research work in [12]. Speciﬁcally, they propose a
dual approximate approach that transforms the MDP problem into a linear programming problem that can be solved in a real-time manner. An intelligent residential
energy management system is introduced in [13] aiming at the reduction of the prosumers’ electricity bills, while guaranteeing the satisfaction of the electricity demand
constraints under various examined cases of the household loads and renewable energy resources supply. A smart load estimator based on a neural networks’ approach
is developed in [14] considering the ambient temperature, the time of the day, the
time of use price, and the peak demand constraints imposed by the smart grid operator. Furthermore, an auction-based approach is introduced in [15] among the
electric vehicles (EVs) that store electricity and the smart grid electricity aggregator that buys the EVs’ electricity surplus. The solution of the auction-based DRM
problem determines the optimal amount of electricity sold by each EV, as well as
the corresponding price.
Focusing on the prosumer-centric DRM solutions, a privacy preserving DRM
framework is discussed in [16], where a reinforcement learning approach is adopted
to explore the prosumers’ privacy protection behaviors and learn their electricity
consumption patterns. In [17], highly resolved electricity consumption models are
designed to estimate the residential demand by quantifying the prosumers’ electricity
use behavior. Thus, the optimal schedule of the prosumers’ appliances is determined
considering the time-varying electricity prices. Moreover, the prosumers’ behavior in
terms of consuming electricity has been further studied in [18] towards introducing
a pricing-based demand response model for smart homes that consists of various
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types of household devices. In this research work, the DRM problem is examined
under diﬀerent requirements regarding the user satisfaction levels, which impose
diﬀerent constraints in the corresponding formulated optimization problem. The
problem of improving the prosumers’ conﬁdentiality, while scheduling the electricity
consumption of their personal appliances, is studied in [19], where a mathematical
framework is introduced in order to simplify the operation of the advanced metering
infrastructure in terms of communication requirements during the DRM process.
More recently, a blockchain-based decentralized DRM framework is introduced
in [20] in order to store and process the data generated from the prosumers’ smart
meters, and exploit the blockchain environment to validate the requests of electricity consumption, dynamic pricing, and electricity transaction executions. Another
prosumer-centric DRM solution is proposed in [21] by considering a multi-periodic
smart grid DRM problem characterized by shifted demand. The authors consider
two major types of players, i.e., prosumers and electricity providers, and they analytically determine the Nash Equilibria towards maintaining the viability of the smart
grid infrastructure over the examined time period. Moreover, the authors in [22] have
focused their study on the DRM problem related to managing the energy consumption of the lighting and air-conditioner systems, while jointly minimizing the users’
discomfort levels. The authors jointly consider the various uncertain environmental
factors, as well as the prosumers’ uncertain psycho-economic factors and introduce a
kernel-based learning approach to determine the optimal price and energy consumption.
Additionally, in [23], a distributed system-wide framework is designed in order
to dynamically adapt the system load proﬁle towards minimizing the prosumer’s
payments, while guaranteeing their comfort and privacy constraints. In [24], a distributed prosumers’ utility maximization framework is proposed, where the optimal
prices and the demand schedules are determined in order for each prosumer to max-
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imize its net beneﬁt subject to various consumption and power ﬂow constraints. A
mixed integer non-linear optimization problem is formulated in [25] towards determining the scheduling of the prosumers’ appliances, while considering the electricity
price and the penalty associated to peaks of electricity consumption, and at the same
time guaranteeing the prosumers’ comfort constraints. A non-cooperative game of
incomplete information among the prosumers is formulated in [26] and a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium solution is derived in order to minimize the peak-to-average ratio within the smart grid system. In [27], a prosumers’ classiﬁcation framework is
proposed to categorize the prosumers in two main types based on their electricity
consumption behavior, i.e., non-green comfort seeking behavior and green incentive
seeking behavior.
A sustainable microgrid model is designed in [28] based on the blockchain technology. A demand response system under uncertain environments, taking into account economic, environmental, and social goals, is developed using a robust fuzzy
multi-objective optimization programming based approach. It leverages the smart
contracts in the blockchain technology to design a real time-based demand response
program. To tackle the optimal energy trading management (OETM) problem in a
microgrid, [29] proposes a two-stage stochastic p-robust method taking into consideration uncertainties arising from Photovoltaics, Wind Turbines, users’ loads and the
market’s price. They also use a hybrid demand response management to decrease
and shift the peak load to reduce the operational cost to ensure the reliability and
robustness of the system. In [30], a Stackelberg game based approach is taken in
coordination with sequence operation theory and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions to optimize load scheduling while dealing with the uncertainty of
renewable systems.
Taking both cost minimization and environmental issue into account, [31] designed a home appliance scheduling framework based on game theory and fuzzy
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compromising method to optimize consumption cost, users’ comfort and gaseous
emission. They also incorporated conditional value at risk (CVaR) parameter to
resolve sudden failure or absence of distributed sources. [32] treats demand response
management as a scheduling problem where each user can be considered as a job,
that cannot be scheduled before or after a deadline. They solve this problem in both
online and oﬄine setting, where the online problem is tackled with a competitive
algorithm and the oﬄine problem is dealt with a rectangular scheduling method.
A robust optimization based method proposed by [33] treats the energy management as a scheduling problem where the authors consider both energy cost and user
comfort. The uncertainties associated with appliances were represented as intervals
and a solution was proposed based on the combination of Harris-Hawk optimization
and integer linear programming. But the issue of renewable energy sources was not
taken into account. [34] also takes a similar approach for minimizing user discomfort
and cost based on a self-scheduling approach. On the other hand, [35] also treats
demand response as a scheduling problem where the uncertainties related to the grid
is analysed, but their goal was to design a battery-storage system for home use. They
try to optimize the battery size to both reduce cost and ensure reliability.
[36] proposes a real-time demand response approach that uses a data driven
model free learning approach that can take in consideration the uncertainties stemming from supply, demand and storage, without knowing an accurate mathematical
model for their distribution. In [37] the authors propose a framework for demand
response in multi-energy systems taking into account the renewable energy sources.
Stochastic programming formulation is exploited to capture the uncertainties of the
system and optimal clustering analysis is used to solve the problem.
In [38], the authors propose an incentive mechanism to tackle the uncertainty in
consumer responsiveness towards the pricing mechanism and increase the satisfaction of the producer. Using a principal-agent scenario, they manage to increase the

6

Chapter 1. Introduction

users’ responsiveness even though the responsiveness is not directly observable. [39]
attempts to build on the model of [38], where the authors consider a continuum of
consumers with a mean-ﬁeld interaction. The producer only has knowledge of the
aggregate consumption which is impacted by a common noise. The authors show
that they can improve the satisfaction of the producer.

1.2

Contributions & Outline

Despite the eﬀorts made in the previous works, in regards to the demand response
management problem, how to incorporate the prosumer’s personalized electricity
consumption and generation dynamic behavior within the smart grid systems still
remains to be an open issue. Moreover, to facilitate the smooth interaction among
the electricity market and the prosumers, how to capture their economics-based
relationships towards both parties of competing interests concluding to mutually
acceptable decisions that jointly maximize their proﬁt is even challenging.
In this work, we strive to tackle these issues [40]. In detail, the design goal
is to capture the prosumers’ personalized characteristics via modeling their unique
personalized types within the smart grid system, depending on their electricity generation capabilities, as well as their electricity consumption needs, and represent
their proﬁt in appropriately designed utility functions. Towards dealing with the
demand response management, a contract-theoretic approach is introduced based on
the principles of labor economics [41–45] to study the interactions of the electricity
market and the prosumers. The proposed contract-theoretic demand response management approach jointly targets at the proﬁt maximization both of the prosumers
and the electricity market. The latter novelty is fundamental in the ﬁeld of DRM
problems dealing with prosumers, as the existing research works mainly consider the
proﬁt maximization of the electricity market. Contract Theory provides the nov-

7

Chapter 1. Introduction

elty of treating the prosumers in a personalized manner in terms of their electricity
generation and consumption characteristics, and the corresponding price that they
are willing to pay in order to be incentivized to participate in the demand response
management process. The main contributions of this research work that diﬀerentiate
it from the rest of the literature, are summarized below.
1. A contract-theoretic demand response management approach is introduced
that considers the unique electricity generation and consumption characteristics of the prosumers in order to determine the optimal electricity consumption.
Following the principles of labor economics of Contract Theory, the electricity market acts as an “employer”, oﬀering personalized rewards, i.e., amount
of electricity at a corresponding price, to the prosumers. The prosumers act
as “employees” oﬀering as “eﬀort” to the electricity market, the corresponding amount of electricity at the announced price that they are willing to buy.
By treating the prosumers in a personalized manner, the electricity market
can optimize its proﬁt by exploiting the prosumers’ purchasing capacity in
an optimal manner, while the prosumers can also jointly optimize their proﬁt
by determining the optimal amount of purchased electricity at the announced
price.
2. The contract-theoretic DRM problem is studied under complete information,
i.e., the electricity market is aware of the prosumers personalized characteristics, and incomplete information. The solution of the contract-theoretic DRM
optimization problem concludes to the optimal contracts that consist of the
electricity market’s oﬀered optimal rewards to incentivize the prosumers to
buy electricity at an announced price and the prosumers’ optimal amount of
purchased electricity to optimize their proﬁt considering their electricity consumption and generation constraints.
3. A series of experiments are performed to evaluate the performance of the overall
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contract-theoretic DRM framework both in the cases of complete and incomplete information from the electricity market’s side, in terms of electricity consumption, electricity market’s and prosumers’ proﬁt, and social welfare. The
results reveal that the contract-theoretic DRM framework achieves only 36.3%
reduction of the overall smard grid system’s social welfare under the worst
case scenario of incomplete information compared to the benchmarking use
case of complete information. Also, the impact of considering the prosumers’
personalized characteristics in the DRM performance is studied via a thorough
comparative evaluation by examining diﬀerent pricing policies from the electricity market’s perspective. Furthermore, a detailed comparative evaluation
with alternative DRM approaches demonstrates our proposed framework’s superiority and beneﬁts. The results conclude that an average increase of the
prosumers’ proﬁt by 42% is achieved due to their personalized treatment by
the electricity market, while at the same time the latter one increases its proﬁt
due to the optimal exploitation of the prosumers’ purchasing power.

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2.1.1 explains the system
model, while the prosumers’ and the electricity market’s proﬁts within the demand
response management are captured through holistically designed utility functions
in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, respectively. The contract-theoretic DRM problem is
studied under complete information in Section 2.2, and incomplete information in
Section 2.3. Simulation results are presented in Section 3.1. Finally, Chapter 4
concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Demand Response Management in
Smart Grid Systems

2.1
2.1.1

System Model
Residential Smart Grid System Operation & Notation

A residential smart grid system is considered consisting of the electricity market,
the advanced metering infrastructure, the load controller, the scheduling manager,
the renewable energy system, the storage system, and the number of appliances, as
presented in Fig. 2.1. The renewable energy system can consist of rooftop solar photovoltaics or small wind turbine power generation systems. The produced electricity
at the residential level is consumed to cover the prosumers’ needs, while the surplus
is stored at the storage system. The latter consists of rechargeable batteries, such as
lithium-ion batteries.
The residential smart grid system consists of N = {1, . . . , n, . . . , |N |} prosumers
and the time is divided into equal time slots t, t ∈ T , where T = {1, . . . , t, . . . , |T |}.
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Prosumer
Advanced Metering
Infrastructure
Scheduling
Manager

Electricity
Market

Load Controller

Renewable
Energy System
Storage System

Appliances

Figure 2.1: Residential Smart Grid System

Each prosumer n has a set of appliances An = {1, 2, . . . , an , . . . , |An |}, where part
of them have shiftable electricity demands, e.g., washer, dryer, and some of them
essential demands, such as refrigerator, alarm system. The operation schedule of
|T |

each appliance an is denoted by San = {s1an , s2an , . . . , stan , . . . , san }, where stan = 1,
if the appliance an operates at time slot t, and stan = 0, otherwise. Considering
when it operates during the time slot t, then,
that the appliance an consumes EaON
n
∑
.
the electricity consumption of the prosumer n is derived as lnt = an ∈An stan · EaON
n
Therefore, the electricity demand vector of all the prosumers in time slot t is given
as follows.
t
L = [l1t , l2t , . . . , lnt , . . . , l|N
| ], t ∈ T

(2.1)

It is noted that lnmin ≤ lnt ≤ lnM ax , where lnmin represents the prosumer’s total
essential electricity demands, and lnM ax captures the total electricity demand of the
prosumer.
Furthermore, each prosumer can generate electricity through its personal renew-
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able energy resources. The renewable generation output of all the prosumers in time
slot t is denoted as follows.
t
G = [g1t , g2t , . . . , gnt , . . . , g|N
| ], t ∈ T

(2.2)

In the following analysis, the prosumer’s n overall electricity demand lnt and renewable generation output gnt are considered to follow uniform distributions, and
numerical details are provided in Section 3.1. Given the prosumer’s electricity demand and generation, the following two cases are examined.
Case A: If gnt ≥ lnt that means that the prosumer generates more electricity compared
to its actual demand during time slot t. Therefore, the prosumer can cover its own
electricity needs without entering the electricity market to buy electricity. In the
special sub-case that gnt > lnt , then the electricity generation surplus of the prosumer,
i.e., (gnt − lnt ), is stored at its residential storage system for future use. Thus, in the
next time slot, the available stored electricity is bt+1
= btn +(gnt −lnt ), where btn denotes
n
the available electricity in the storage system of the prosumer n in time slot t.
amount
< lnt , then the prosumer needs to purchase lnt − gnt − bt−1
Case B: If gnt + bt−1
n
n
of electricity from the electricity market, as its generated and stored electricity are
not suﬃcient to cover its demand. In this case, the prosumer enters the electricity
market demanding lnt − gnt − bnt−1 amount of electricity and paying a corresponding
price.
Let us normalize the electricity bought by each prosumer n from the electricity
market as follows.
dtn =

lnt − gnt − bnt−1
t
∈ (0, 1], n ∈ Nbuy
maxt {lnt − gnt − bnt−1 }

(2.3)

∀n∈Nbuy

t
< lnt } ⊆ N is the set of prosumers buying electricity
= {n ∈ N : gnt + bt−1
where Nbuy
n

from the electricity market in time slot t.
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Given the normalized electricity that is bought from the prosumers that enter
t
the electricity market, we deﬁne the type of each prosumer n, n ∈ Nbuy
, as follows.

τnt =

dtn

t
∈ (0, 1], n ∈ Nbuy

t |
|Nbuy

∑

(2.4)

dtn

n=1

The physical meaning of the prosumer’s type is that it represents the normalized
need of the prosumer to buy electricity from the electricity market compared to the
rest of the prosumers that compete for the same resource (i.e., electricity) during
each time slot t. It is noted that the prosumers’ types dynamically change per
time slot considering their electricity demands and generation characteristics and
characterize each prosumer in a unique and personalized manner. It is obvious that
a prosumer who can support its personal electricity demand without entering the
electricity market (Case A) during a time slot t has no type, and it does not compete
with the rest of the prosumers for the valuable resource of electricity. In the rest
of the analysis, we consider the most heterogeneous and challenging scenario, where
t
each prosumer has its own personal type τnt , thus, |Nbuy
| types of prosumers exist

during time slot t. Also, for notation convenience in the presentation, we consider
t
that a prosumer of higher type, i.e., τ1t < τ2t < · · · < τnt < · · · < τ|N
t | , has a
buy

higher normalized request for buying electricity from the electricity market, i.e.,
dt1 < dt2 < · · · < dtn < · · · < dt|N t | , as it is derived from Eq. 2.4.
buy

2.1.2

Prosumers Contract-theoretic Utility Function

In the following sections, the principles of labor economics are adopted following the
corresponding Contract Theory to drive the examined residential smart grid system
to stable and eﬃcient operation points [46]. Speciﬁcally, Contract Theory builds labor economics-based relationships among the actors involved in the residential smart
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grid system, i.e., the electricity market and the prosumers, and incentivizes them to
behave in a beneﬁcial manner for the overall system, by providing appropriately
designed contracts for both actors [47]. Based on the contract-theoretic model, an
employer oﬀers personalized rewards to the employees towards incentivizing them to
demonstrate a beneﬁcial behavior for the overall system, while the employees oﬀer
their eﬀort to the employer as an exchange. The tuple of {reward, eﬀort} creates a
personalized contract among the employer and each employee. If both parties follow
the optimal contracts, the overall system concludes to a stable and eﬃcient mode
of operation. Contract Theory has already been applied in several ﬁelds, such as
vehicular networks [48], optimal charging schemes of electric vehicles in smart grid
systems [49], federated learning in mobile networks [50], public safety systems [47],
and cognitive radio networks [51].
The rationale behind applying the principles of Contract Theory, as well as the
novelty of the proposed contract-theoretic demand response management approach,
lies in the observation that treating the prosumers in a personalized manner can
jointly improve the proﬁt of the electricity market, as well as the prosumers’ proﬁt.
Speciﬁcally, the contract-theoretic DRM approach enables the electricity market to
incentivize the prosumers to purchase an optimal personalized amount of electricity
at the announced price, while exploiting their personal electricity generation and
consumption characteristics.
Within the examined residential smart grid system, the prosumers act as "employees" oﬀering their "eﬀort" to the electricity market. The latter acts as an "employer"
oﬀering a personalized reward rnt = τnt · qnt to the prosumer. The physical meaning of this formulation is that the prosumer by purchasing qnt normalized amount of
electricity from the electricity market, it will pay an amount of pt · qnt to the electricity market, where pt ∈ (0, 1] is the unitless price of the electricity unit. Thus,
the electricity market will gain proﬁt from the prosumers’ purchase. On the other
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hand, the electricity market should incentivize the prosumers to buy electricity at
the announced price pt during time slot t. Thus, it oﬀers a personalized reward rnt
proportional to their purchased electricity, while accounting for their type τnt within
the smart grid system.
Following the above analysis, the personalized contract that is established among
the electricity market and each prosumer is the tuple {rnt (qnt ), qnt }. By receiving
the reward rnt (qnt ), each prosumer evaluates it in a diﬀerent manner given the electricity demand (i.e., shiftable or essential) that it covers towards its personalized
satisfaction. Thus, we deﬁne the prosumer’s evaluation function etn (rnt ) as a strictly
increasing, concave function with respect to the prosumer’s eﬀort qnt ∈ (0, dtn ] ⊆ (0, 1],
with etn (rnt = 0) = 0. For demonstration purposes and without loss of generality, in
√
the following analysis we consider etn (rnt ) = rnt . It is noted that the adoption of
any other form of the evaluation function that respects the aforementioned properties would not change the theoretical analysis presented below, but the intermediate
derivations.
The contract-theoretic utility of each prosumer represents the prosumer’s pure
personalized perceived satisfaction from the obtained reward (ﬁrst term of Eq. 2.5),
while considering its personalized cost by investing its eﬀort via buying electricity
from the electricity market (second term of Eq. 2.5). The physical meaning of the
ﬁrst term of Eq. 2.5 is that each prosumer interprets the received reward rnt (qnt ) in
a personalized manner based on its type τnt in order to determine its pure perceived
satisfaction. Thus, the greater the type of the prosumers is, which means that
the prosumer has greater electricity demand (Eq. 2.4), the more satisfaction it
perceives, as it is enabled to cover more electricity needs. Thus, the prosumer’s
contract-theoretic utility function is deﬁned as follows.

Unt (qnt ) = τnt etn (qnt ) − pt qnt

(2.5)
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It is noted that the prosumer’s utility function is unitless to keep the holistic
applicability of the proposed framework. In a real-life application of the proposed
theoretical framework, the prosumers’ eﬀort can be mapped to KWh and the electricity market’s reward to monetary units (e.g., discount, coupons).

2.1.3

Electricity Market Utility

The electricity market has partial or even no available information regarding the
t
prosumers’ types. Thus, by oﬀering appropriately designed rewards rnt , ∀n ∈ Nbuy

to incentivize the prosumers to buy electricity at the announced price pt , it aims
to implicitly reveal their types and consequently their electricity consumption and
generation characteristics. Therefore, the electricity market estimates the prosumers’
t |
|Nbuy
∑
types with probability P rnt , where
P rnt = 1. Thus, the electricity market’s
n=1

utility accounting for the prosumers that buy electricity is deﬁned as follows.
t |
|Nbuy

t
UEM
(qt )

=

∑

[P rnt (pt · qnt − rnt (qnt ))]

(2.6)

n=1

t
where qt = (q1t , q2t , . . . , qnt , . . . q|N
t | ) is the normalized purchased electricity vector
buy

of the

t
|Nbuy
|

prosumers that buy electricity in time slot t. The physical meaning

of Eq. 2.6 is that the ﬁrst term denotes the electricity market’s revenue, while the
second term expresses its cost to provide the rewards to the prosumers. Thus, Eq.
2.6 captures the electricity market’s proﬁt.
Furthermore, the overall social welfare of the examined residential smart grid
system is deﬁned as follows.
t |
|Nbuy

t
SW t (qt ) = UEM
(qt ) +

∑

Unt (qnt )

n=1
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In the following two sections, the contract-theoretic demand response management problem is examined under the cases of complete and incomplete information
of the electricity market regarding the prosumers’ types. In both cases, our goal is
to determine the optimal contracts that will jointly optimize the electricity market’s
and the prosumers’ utilities and conclude to a stable and eﬃcient operation point of
the residential smart grid system.

2.2

Prosumers’ Contracts under Complete Information

In this section, the ideal case where the electricity market knows the prosumers types
t
τnt , ∀n ∈ Nbuy
is examined, mainly for benchmarking purposes. Given the available

complete information of the prosumers’ types to the electricity market, the latter
knows the potential amount of electricity that the prosumers are willing to buy, thus,
it can fully exploit the prosumers’ purchasing power. The electricity market aims
to maximize its utility, while guaranteeing that it will oﬀer personalized rewards to
the prosumers, which will satisfy their individual rationality (IR) and ﬁnally accept
to purchase an amount of electricity that will satisfy their demands. Therefore, the
contract-theoretic DRM problem under complete information among the electricity
market and each prosumer can be formulated as follows.
max

t ,q t }
{rn
n ∀n∈N t

t
[UEM
(qnt ) = pt · qnt − rnt (qnt )]

(2.8a)

buy

s.t. Unt (qnt ) = τnt etn (qnt ) − pt qnt ≥ 0 (IR)

(2.8b)

The electricity market aims to maximize its proﬁt, while guaranteeing the minimum acceptable satisfaction for the prosumers in order to purchase electricity. Thus,
the prosumers’ IR constraint in Eq. 2.8b can be reduced to an equality.
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Theorem 1. The optimal contract among the electricity market and each prosumer
t

t2

t
n, n ∈ Nbuy
under the complete information scenario is {( τ2n )2 , τ2pn t }.

Proof. Based on the reduced IR constraint in Eq. 2.8b, we have rnt (qnt ) = ( p τ·qt n )2 .
t

t

n

By substituting the rnt (qnt ) = ( p τ·qt n )2 in Eq. 2.8a, diﬀerentiating with respect to qnt ,
t

t

n

and equating the outcome to zero, we have qnt =

2

τnt
,
2pt

t

thus, rnt = ( τ2n )2 .
t

t2

The physical meaning of the optimal contract {rnt , qnt } = {( τ2n )2 , τ2pn t } is that the
prosumers purchase electricity proportionally to their demands and inverse proportionally to the announced price by the electricity market. Also, the electricity market
oﬀers rewards aligned with each prosumer’s personal needs to purchase electricity towards eventually incentivizing it to perform the purchase at the announced price pt .

2.3

Contract-theoretic Demand Response
Management under Incomplete Information

In this section, the general case of incomplete information regarding the electricity
market not knowing the prosumers’ types, thus, being unaware of the potential
amount of electricity that they are interested to buy, is examined. This scenario is
the most realistic one in a residential smart grid system, where the electricity market
aims at incentivizing the prosumers to buy electricity at an announced price. Our
goal is to determine the optimal contract {rnt , qnt } among the electricity market and
each prosumer towards maximizing the electricity market’s proﬁt, while guaranteeing
the optimal satisfaction of the prosumers’ electricity demands. Each prosumer should
at least receive a positive utility, while purchasing electricity from the electricity
market, in order to be incentivized to perform the purchase. This constraint captures
the individual rationality (IR) of each prosumer. Furthermore, each prosumer aims
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at achieving the optimal utility that better captures its own personal electricity
consumption and generation characteristics, by receiving a reward from the electricity
market to perform its purchase. This constraint captures the incentive compatibility
(IC) of each prosumer. The prosumers’ IR and IC constraints are formally deﬁned
as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. (Individual Rationality (IR)) An optimal contract {rnt , qnt } should
guarantee a non-negative utility Unt (qnt ) for each prosumer, i.e., Unt (qnt ) = τnt etn (qnt ) −
t
pt qnt ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ Nbuy
.

Deﬁnition 2. (Incentive Compatibility (IC)) An optimal contract {rnt , qnt } should
be designed in a personalized manner for each prosumer considering its personal
electricity consumption and generation characteristics captured via its type τnt , i.e.,
t
, n ̸= n′ .
τnt etn (qnt ) − pt qnt ≥ τnt etn′ (qnt ′ ) − pt qnt ′ , ∀n, n′ ∈ Nbuy

Except for the IR and IC constraints that should hold true in order to conclude to
the optimal contracts, some additional properties and conditions should be satisﬁed.
The latter ones are described in Propositions 1-3, as follows.
Proposition 1. (Fairness) An optimal contract {rnt , qnt } should provide higher (or
equal) reward to the prosumers of higher (or the same) type, i.e., rnt > rnt ′ ⇔ τnt > τnt ′
(rnt = rnt ′ ⇔ τnt = τnt ′ ).
Proof. Both the suﬃciency, i.e., τnt > τnt ′ ⇒ rnt > rnt ′ , and the necessity, i.e., rnt >
rnt ′ ⇒ τnt > τnt ′ of the fairness condition are shown. Towards proving the suﬃciency,
t
we exploit the IC constraint. Thus, ∀n, n′ ∈ Nbuy
, n ̸= n′ , we have:

τnt etn (rnt ) − pt qnt ≥ τnt etn′ (rnt ′ ) − pt qnt ′

(2.9)

τnt ′ etn′ (rnt ′ ) − pt qnt ′ ≥ τnt ′ etn (rnt ) − pt qnt

(2.10)
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We add Eq. 2.9 and Eq. 2.10, and we derive the the following expression.

τnt etn (rnt ) + τnt ′ etn′ (rnt ′ ) ≥ τnt etn′ (rnt ′ ) + τnt ′ etn (rnt )

(2.11)

Thus, we have (τnt − τnt ′ ) · etn (rnt ) ≥ (τnt − τnt ′ ) · etn′ (rnt ′ ). Given that τnt > τnt ′ ,
we conclude that etn (rnt ) > etn′ (rnt ′ ). The prosumers’ evaluation function is strictly
increasing with respect to rnt and by having the same form for all the prosumers (i.e.,
etn = etn′ = e), we conclude that rnt > rnt ′ .
Towards showing the necessity of the fairness condition, we know that rnt >
rnt ′ , and the evaluation function is strictly increasing, i.e., etn (rnt ) − etn′ (rnt ′ ) > 0.
By exploiting Eq. 2.11, we have the following expression: τnt [etn (rnt ) − etn′ (rnt ′ )] ≥
τnt ′ [etn (rnt ) − etn′ (rnt ′ )], thus, τnt > τnt ′ . Finally, towards examining the special case of
rnt = rnt ′ ⇔ τnt = τnt ′ , a similar analysis can be followed.

The physical meaning of Proposition 1 is that a prosumer of higher type, i.e.,
willing to buy more electricity from the electricity market, should be rewarded with
a higher reward for fairness purposes.
Proposition 2. (Monotonicity) A prosumer will receive a higher reward, i.e., r1t <
t
t
t
r2t < · · · < rnt < · · · < r|N
t | , if it is characterized by higher type, i.e., τ1 < τ2 <
buy

t
t
t
· · · < τnt < · · · < τ|N
t | , as it will purchase more electricity, i.e., q1 < q2 < · · · <
buy

qnt

< ··· <

t
q|N
.
t
buy |

t
Proof. The ﬁrst statement, i.e., r1t < r2t < · · · < rnt < · · · < r|N
t

buy |

⇔ τ1t < τ2t < · · · <

t
τnt < · · · < τ|N
t | , can be derived from the proof of Proposition 1. Then, we have,
buy

t
r1t < r2t < · · · < rnt < · · · < r|N
t

buy |

and given that

τ1t

<

τ2t

< ··· <

τnt

t
t
⇔ τ1t q1t < τ2t q2t < · · · < τnt qnt < · · · < τ|N
t | q|N t
buy

< ··· <

t
qnt < · · · < q|N
t |.
buy
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q1t

<

q2t
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The physical meaning of Proposition 2 is that a prosumer of higher type, receives
a greater reward in order the electricity market to exploit its full potential (i.e.,
purchasing power) to purchase a greater amount of electricity.
The conditions and constraints of individual rationality, incentive compatibility,
fairness, monotonicity, and rationality should all hold true in order the prosumers
to be incentivized to participate in the demand response management process, while
strategically deciding the amount of purchased electricity at the announced price
by the electricity market [46, 52]. Thus, the contract-theoretic DRM problem is
formulated as a maximization problem of the electricity market’s utility (Eq. 2.12a),
while guaranteeing the prosumers’ constraints (Eq. 2.12b - Eq. 2.12d), as follows.
Proposition 3. (Rationality) A prosumer of higher type, i.e., τ1t < τ2t < · · · < τnt <
t
t
t
t
t
· · · < τ|N
t | , will receive a greater utility, i.e., U1 < U2 < · · · < Un < · · · < U|N t | .
buy

buy

t
Proof. Considering two indicative prosumers n, n′ ∈ Nbuy
, n ̸= n′ , with τnt >

τnt ′ and based on the IC constraint, we have τnt etn (qnt ) − pt qnt ≥ τnt etn′ (qnt ′ ) −
τnt >τ t ′

pt qnt ′ ⇐===n⇒Unt (qnt ) = τnt etn (qnt ) − pt qnt > τnt ′ etn′ (qnt ′ ) − pt qnt ′ = Unt ′ (qnt ′ ). Thus, by
generalizing this analysis for all the prosumers that purchase electricity during the
t
time slot t, we have τ1t < τ2t < · · · < τnt < · · · < τ|N
t

buy |

⇔ U1t < U2t < · · · < Unt <

t
· · · < U|N
t |.
buy

The physical meaning of Proposition 3 is that a prosumer of higher type, who
will eventually purchase more electricity (Proposition 2), it will experience greater
utility, i.e., satisfaction, as it will cover more electricity needs.
The conditions and constraints of individual rationality, incentive compatibility,
fairness, monotonicity, and rationality should all hold true in order the prosumers
to be incentivized and willing to purchase an optimal amount of electricity from
the electricity market. Thus, the contract-theoretic DRM problem is formulated
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as a maximization problem of the electricity market’s utility (Eq. 2.12a), while
guaranteeing the prosumers constraints (Eq. 2.12b - Eq. 2.12d), as follows.
t |
|Nbuy

max
t

t ,q }
{rn
n ∀n∈N t

t
(qt ) =
UEM

buy

∑

[P rnt (pt · qnt − rnt (qnt ))]

(2.12a)

n=1

s.t. τnt etn (qnt ) − pt qnt ≥ 0 (IR)

(2.12b)

t
(IC)
τnt etn (qnt ) − pt qnt ≥ τnt etn′ (qnt ′ ) − pt qnt ′ , ∀n ̸= n′ ∈ Nbuy

(2.12c)

t
0 ≤ r1t < r2t < · · · < rnt < · · · < r|N
t

(2.12d)

buy |

In the following analysis, our goal is to reduce the constraints of the non-convex
optimization problem (2.12a)-(2.12d), in order to solve it in a tractable manner.
Initially, we examine the reduction of the IR constraint (2.12b). By considering the
ﬁndings of Proposition 2 and given the IC constraint, we have τnt etn (qnt ) − pt qnt ≥
τnt etn′ (qnt ′ ) − pt qnt ′ ≥ τnt et1 (q1t ) − pt q1t . However, we know that τnt > τ1t , thus, we derive
that τnt etn (qnt ) − pt qnt ≥ τnt et1 (q1t ) − pt q1t ≥ τ1t et1 (q1t ) − pt q1t . Therefore, we observe that
if τ1t et1 (q1t ) − pt q1t ≥ 0 holds true, then the IR constraint will hold true for every
t
prosumer n ∈ Nbuy
. Thus, the IR constraint in Eq. 2.12b can be reduced to the

constraint τ1t et1 (q1t ) − pt q1t = 0, considering that the electricity market will try to
exploit the maximum beneﬁt from the prosumers’ purchasing power.
Then, our goal is to reduce the IC constraints, as presented in Eq. 2.12c. In the
following, we use the terminology of downward and upward IC constraints among
the prosumers, as follows: (1) n, n′ , n′ ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}: downward IC constraints,
t
t
(2) n, n′ , n′ ∈ {n + 1, . . . , |Nbuy
|}: upward IC constraints, (3) n, n + 1, n ∈ Nbuy
: local
t
upward IC constraint, (4) n, n − 1, n ∈ Nbuy
: local downward IC constraint.

Theorem 2. The local downward IC constraint equivalently captures all the downward IC constraints.
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t
t
Proof. The local downward IC constraints for three prosumers, i.e., τn−1
< τnt < τn+1
,

are written as follows.
t
t
t
t
τn+1
etn+1 (rn+1
) − pt qn+1
≥ τn+1
etn (rnt ) − pt qnt

(2.13)

t
t
t
τnt etn (rnt ) − pt qnt ≥ τnt en−1
(rn−1
) − pt qn−1

(2.14)

Furthermore, given that etn−1 = etn = etn+1 = e and the evaluation funct
t
tion is strictly increasing, we have for rnt > rn−1
⇔ etn (rnt ) > etn−1 (rn−1
) ⇔
t
t
t
t
etn (rnt ) − etn−1 (rn−1
) > 0. Therefore, for τn+1
> τnt ⇔ τn+1
[etn (rnt ) − etn−1 (rn−1
)] >
t
t
τnt [etn (rnt ) − etn−1 (rn−1
)]≥Eq.2.14 pt (qnt − qn−1
). Thus, by recursively applying the previt
t
t
t
t
t
t
ous outcome, we conclude that τn+1
etn+1 (rn+1
) − pt qn+1
≥ τn+1
en−1
(rn−1
) − pt qn−1
≥
t
t
t
t
et1 (r1t ) − pt q1t . Therefore, we derive the following
≥ · · · ≥ τn+1
) − pt qn−2
etn−2 (rn−2
τn+1

equivalent constraint,
t
t
τnt etn (rnt ) − pt qnt ≥ τnt etn−1 (rn−1
) − pt qn−1

(2.15)

which means that the local downward IC constraint equivalently captures all the
downward IC constraints.
Theorem 3. The local downward IC constraint equivalently captures all the upward
IC constraints.
t
t
Proof. Considering again three prosumers, i.e., τn−1
< τnt < τn+1
, we write the IC

constraints, as follows.
t
t
t
t
etn (rnt ) − pt qnt
≥ τn−1
) − pt qn−1
etn−1 (rn−1
τn−1

(2.16)

t
t
τnt etn (rnt ) − pt qnt ≥ τnt etn+1 (rn+1
) − pt qn+1

(2.17)
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Based on the fairness property, we have rnt > rnt ′ ⇔ τnt > τnt ′ . Therefore, by Eq.
2.17, we can derive the following expression.
t

t

t
t
pt (qn+1
− qnt ) ≥ τnt [etn+1 (rn+1
) − etn (rnt )] ≥τn >τn−1
t
t
τn−1
[etn+1 (rn+1
)

−

(2.18)

etn (rnt )]

t
t
t
t
By Eq. 2.16 and Eq. 2.18, we have τn−1
etn−1 (rn−1
) − pt qn−1
≥ τn−1
etn (rnt ) − pt qnt ≥
t
t
t
t
t
t
τn−1
etn+1 (rn+1
) − pt qn+1
. Therefore, we conclude that τn−1
etn−1 (rn−1
) − pt qn−1
≥
t
t
t
τn−1
etn+1 (rn+1
) − pt qn+1
, which means that if the IC constraint is satisﬁed for the
t
prosumer with type τn−1
, then, all the upward IC constraints also hold true. By ret
t
t
t
t
cursively applying this outcome, we have τn−1
etn−1 (rn−1
) − pt qn−1
≥ τn−1
etn+1 (rn+1
)−
t
t t
t
t
et|N t | (r|N
≥ · · · ≥ τn−1
pt qn+1
t | ) − p q|N t | . Thus, we conclude that the local downbuy

buy

buy

ward IC constraint can capture all the upward IC constraints.
By considering the above analysis and the outcomes of Theorem 2 and 3, the
contract-theoretic DRM problem under incomplete information can be written as
follows.
t |
|Nbuy

max
t

t ,q }
{rn
n ∀n∈N t

t
UEM
(qt ) =

buy

∑

[P rnt (pt · qnt − rnt (qnt ))]

(2.19a)

n=1

s.t. τ1t et1 (q1t ) − pt q1t = 0

(2.19b)

t
t
τnt etn (qnt ) − pt qnt = τnt etn−1 (qn−1
) − pt qn−1

(2.19c)

t
0 ≤ r1t < r2t < · · · < rnt < · · · < r|N
t

(2.19d)

buy |

The above optimization problem is a convex one, as both the objective function
and the constraints are convex. Thus, it can be easily solved by using standard convex
t
optimization methods, in order to derive the optimal contracts {rnt , qnt }∀n∈Nbuy
.
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Experiments

3.1

Numerical Results

In this section, a detailed numerical evaluation is presented to study the performance
and inherent attributes of the proposed contract-theoretic demand response management framework in smart grid systems. Initially, the pure framework’s operation under the complete and incomplete information scenarios is presented in Section 3.1.1,
while in Section 3.1.2 the performance of the proposed framework under diﬀerent
pricing policies, i.e., low, medium, high, is illustrated. Section 3.1.3 demonstrates
a thorough comparative evaluation between the proposed contract-theoretic DRM
framework and a prosumers’ type-agnostic DRM approach, as well as the beneﬁts of
our framework compared to various prosumers’ electricity purchasing strategies in
the examined residential smart grid system.
We consider an indicative residential smart grid system consisting of |N | = 10
prosumers, who generate gnt KWh amount of electricity per time slot t, uniformly
distributed in the interval [0, 16] KWh and their electricity consumption is also uniformly distributed in the interval lnt ∈ [5, 25] KWh. The initial storage capacity is
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bt=0
= 0KW h, ∀n ∈ N , the announced price is pt = 0.23 (unless otherwise stated)
n
and the probability of the prosumers’ types P rnt follows a uniform distribution. The
proposed frameworks evaluation was conducted in an ASUS laptop with AMD Ryzen
5, 2.1GHz Processor and 8Gb available RAM.

Pure Framework Operation Evaluation
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Figure 3.1: Pure operation evaluation of the contract-theoretic demand response
management framework under complete and incomplete information.
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Figure 3.2: Users’ types and normalized electricity consumption for three representative types of prosumers.
In the following, we present the operational characteristics and the performance
of the proposed contract-theoretic DRM framework under the scenarios of complete
and incomplete information. Fig. 3.1a presents the prosumers’ types τ1t < · · · <
t | in time slot t, where 10 prosumers needed to purchase electricity
τnt < · · · < τ|Nbuy

from the electricity market, and their corresponding normalized electricity demand
dtn is presented in Fig. 3.1b. The prosumers’ purchased normalized electricity qnt
and the prosumers’ personalized rewards rnt for the complete and incomplete infor-
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mation scenarios, as they have been determined by the optimal contacts solutions
of the optimization problems Eq. 2.8a-2.8b and Eq. 2.19a-2.19d, respectively, are
illustrated in Fig. 3.1c and Fig. 3.1d, respectively. The results reveal that the
prosumer of higher type receives a higher reward (Fig. 3.1d), following the fairness
property (Proposition 1), and purchases more electricity (Fig. 3.1c), following the
monotonicity property (Proposition 2), thus, achieving greater utility (Fig. 3.1e),
based on the rationality property (Proposition 3). Also, it is observed that in the
case that the electricity market knows the prosumers’ electricity consumption and
generation characteristics, i.e., types, under the complete information scenario, it
can fully exploit their purchasing power. Thus, the prosumers are incentivized with
greater rewards (Fig. 3.1d) to purchase more electricity (Fig. 3.1c). Furthermore,
given that the electricity market knows the prosumers’ types, it oﬀers them the minimum possible rewards based on their purchased electricity in order to marginally
t
(Fig. 3.1e).
satisfy their rationality constraints, thus, Unt = 0, ∀n ∈ Nbuy

30

Chapter 3. Experiments

WƌŽƐƵŵĞƌΖƐhƚŝůŝƚǇ

ϭĞоϯ
Ϯ
,ŝŐŚŽƐƚ
>ŽǁŽƐƚ
DĞĚŝƵŵŽƐƚ

ϭ

;ĂͿ

Ϭ
ϭ

Ϯ

ϯ

ϰ

ϱ

ϲ

ϳ

ϴ

ϵ

ϭϬ

ϭĞоϯ
ƵŵƵůĂƚŝǀĞhƚŝůŝƚǇ

ůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚǇDĂƌŬĞƚΖƐ

WƌŽƐƵŵĞƌΖƐ/ŶĚĞǆ

,ŝŐŚŽƐƚ
>ŽǁŽƐƚ

ϭ

DĞĚŝƵŵŽƐƚ

;ďͿ

Ϭ
ϭ

Ϯ

ϯ

ϰ

ϱ

ϲ

ϳ

ϴ

ϵ

ϭϬ

EƵŵďĞƌŽĨhƐĞƌƐ

ƵŵƵůĂƚŝǀĞ

^ŽĐŝĂůtĞůĨĂƌĞ

ϭĞоϯ
,ŝŐŚŽƐƚ
>ŽǁŽƐƚ

ϱ

DĞĚŝƵŵŽƐƚ

;ĐͿ

Ϭ
ϭ

Ϯ

ϯ

ϰ

ϱ

ϲ

ϳ

ϴ

ϵ

ϭϬ

EƵŵďĞƌŽĨhƐĞƌƐ

Figure 3.3: Pricing policies and demand response management.
Additionally, Fig. 3.1f illustrates that a prosumer of higher type enjoys greater
utility, as well as the contract that is explicitly designed for its type concludes to the
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best achieved utility. Furthermore, the electricity market’s cumulative utility and
the overall residential smart grid system’s cumulative social welfare are presented in
Fig. 3.1g and Fig. 3.1h, respectively. The results reveal that better performance
is achieved under the complete information scenario, however, the overall system’s
social welfare is on average reduced by 36.3%, while this value becomes even smaller
for larger populations. The latter observation indicates that the proposed framework
behaves in an acceptable manner for realistic implementations with complete lack of
information regarding the prosumers’ characteristics.
Following the previous analysis, we study the prosumers’ behavior over a period of
|T | = 10 time slots. Three indicative types of prosumers are selected: (a) Type A: the
prosumer generates a lot of electricity and has a low electricity demand; (b) Type
B: the prosumer has both medium electricity generation capability and electricity
demand; and (c) Type C: the prosumer generates a small amount of electricity, but
its electricity demand is high. Fig. 3.2a and Fig. 3.2b present the types τnt of
the three examined prosumers, as well as the corresponding normalized purchased
electricity qnt over the time. The results reveal that the prosumers of Type A can
cover their own electricity demands by their generated electricity without entering
the electricity market, thus τnt = 0 and qnt = 0. Also, the prosumers of Type C
have a greater type compared to the prosumers of Type B (Fig. 3.2a), as they have
a greater electricity demand dtn given their electricity consumption and generation
characteristics, as they have been described above, thus, they ﬁnally purchase more
electricity from the electricity market (Fig. 3.2b) to cover their needs.

3.1.2

Pricing Policies & Demand Response Management

In this section, we examine the behavior and performance of the proposed contracttheoretic DRM framework under the incomplete information scenario considering
three diﬀerent pricing policies: (a) Low-cost: the electricity market applies a mild
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personalized pricing policy, i.e., ptn =

√
τnt to each prosumer; (b) Medium-cost: a

personalized pricing policy is announced, i.e., ptn = (τnt )1/3 which is more costly compared to the low-cost policy; and (c) High-cost: a constant high price is announced
to all the prosumers, i.e., pt = 0.6. Fig. 3.3a-3.3c present the prosumers’ utility,
the electricity market’s utility, and the overall residential smart grid system’s social
welfare as a function of the prosumer’s index for all the three examined pricing policies. The results reveal that the higher-cost the pricing policy is, the less are the
prosumers incentivized to buy electricity from the electricity market to cover their
electricity demands. The latter phenomenon results in low values of achieved utility
by the prosumers (Fig. 3.3a). Thus, the electricity market makes less proﬁt resulting
in decreased values of electricity market’s utility, as shown in Fig. 3.3b. Therefore,
for high-cost pricing policies, the social welfare of the overall residential smart grid
system remains low (Fig. 3.3c), given that both the prosumers (Fig. 3.3a) and the
electricity market (Fig. 3.3b) become less satisﬁed.

3.1.3

Comparative Evaluation

In this section, a detailed comparative evaluation is presented to reveal the drawbacks and beneﬁts of the proposed contract-theoretic DRM framework under the
incomplete information scenario. Initially, the beneﬁts of treating the prosumers in
a personalized manner are presented. Thus, we compare our framework, where the
electricity market oﬀers personalized rewards rnt (qnt ) = τnt · qnt to the prosumers based
on their types, to a type-agnostic approach that oﬀers a reward proportional to their
t |
|Nbuy

∑

normalized purchased electricity, i.e.,

rnt (qnt )

=

τnt
n=1
t |
|Nbuy

· qnt .

Fig. 3.4a and Fig. 3.4b illustrate the prosumers’ and the electricity market’s
utilities, respectively, as a function of the prosumers’ index for the two examined
comparative scenarios. The results show that the prosumers beneﬁt regarding their
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Figure 3.4: Type dependent vs. type-agnostic demand response management.
achieved utility under our proposed contract-theoretic framework by approximately
42% on average compared to the type-agnostic framework due to the fact that the
electricity market oﬀers them personalized rewards to better incentivize them to
purchase electricity at the announced price. On the other hand, the electricity market
achieves lower utility compared to the type-agnostic framework, as the latter one
tends to over-reward the prosumers without considering their personal electricity
consumption and generation characteristics.
An additional thorough comparative evaluation is performed considering the different prosumers’ decision-making regarding the purchased electricity. Speciﬁcally,
we compare our proposed contract-theoretic DRM framework to four diﬀerent scenarios: (1) Minimum eﬀort: the prosumers purchase a minimum amount of normalized
electricity, i.e., qnt = min{qnt }∀n · 0.5; (2) Maximum eﬀort: the prosumers purchase
a maximum amount of normalized electricity, i.e., qnt = max{qnt }∀n · 1.5; (3) Ran-
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Figure 3.5: Pricing policies and demand response management.
dom eﬀort: the prosumers purchase a random amount of normalized electricity, i.e.,
qnt ∈ (0, 1], and (4) Guided eﬀort: the prosumers purchase electricity following the
function 10−3 · exp(0.4 · qnt ).
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Fig. 3.5a - 3.5c illustrate the prosumers’ utility, the electricity market’s cumulative utility, and the smart grid system’s cumulative social welfare, respectively.
The results reveal that the proposed contract-theoretic framework explicitly beneﬁts
the prosumers (Fig. 3.5a) given the personalized treatment and incentivization that
they experience, while the electricity market’s proﬁt is limited (Fig. 3.5b). Additionally, by focusing on the system’s social welfare, we observe that the proposed
framework outperforms concluding to a stable and eﬃcient operation point for the
overall examined smart grid system.
Regarding the maximum and minimum electricity purchasing scenarios, we observe that they demonstrate the worst and the second best utility for the prosumers,
respectively, showing that the electricity cost becomes dominant in the prosumers’
satisfaction. The exact opposite holds true for the electricity market’s utility as it collects high and low proﬁt, respectively. Following this discussion, the prosumers’ great
dissatisfaction in the case of purchasing their maximum needed amount of electricity
concludes to the lowest social welfare compared to all other scenarios. Furthermore,
the random and guided eﬀort scenarios present an intermediate behavior compared
to the other extreme scenarios by adopting the principles of Contract Theory and
behavioral economics.
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Conclusions and Future Works
In this thesis, a contract-theoretic demand response management framework is introduced based on the principles of labor economics to support the stable and eﬃcient
operation of smart grid systems. The prosumers electricity consumption and generation characteristics are captured to deﬁne the prosumers’ types. The electricity
market’s and the prosumers’ utilities were designed to represent their proﬁt from
participating in the DRM problem. The contract-theoretic DRM problem is formulated as a maximization problem of the electricity market’s proﬁt, while jointly
guaranteeing the prosumers’ proﬁt optimization accounting for their types.
The problem is solved under the cases of complete and incomplete information
from the electricity market’s perspective regarding knowing or not the prosumers’
types, respectively, and the optimal contracts among both parties with competing
interests are determined. The optimal contracts consist of the amounts of electricity
bought by the prosumers and the corresponding rewards oﬀered by the electricity
market to incentivize them. Detailed numerical results of the pure proposed framework, as well as comparative ones, are presented to show the drawbacks and beneﬁts
of the introduced contract-theoretic DRM framework.
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Our current and future work focuses on extending the proposed framework to
accommodate the prosumers behavioral characteristics. Speciﬁcally, our goal is to
study the prosumers risk-aware decision-making [53], while accounting for their cognitive characteristics [54] in purchasing electricity and selecting utility company under
various price ﬂuctuations [55]. Given the knowledge acquired from the developed
risk-aware decision-making model in the smart grid systems, our goal is to extend
and apply those models in resource management frameworks under diﬀerent pricing
policies, such as market-based pricing [56], price discrimination [57], and dynamic
pricing [58], in next generation wireless networks adopting diﬀerent multiple access
techniques, such as single-carrier frequency division multiple access [59], and communications modes, such as device to device communication [60, 61], machine to
machine communication [62], and Internet of Things environments [63], supporting
single [64] or multiple types of requested services [65].
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